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I. INTRODUCTION
What is personal safety worth? What rights are we willing to sac-
rifice as a society in return for our personal safety? How important is
public safety and how much power does the State have to make laws
that secure the community's safety, while compromising the personal
liberty of others? Preventative detention for a few, as opposed to per-
sonal safety for the many, is a legitimate state goal and is one of the
sacrifices we make for safety as a society and civilized populous.
Earl Shriner and Andre Brigham Young are infamous in sex of-
fender case law and literature. Both served convictions for sex offenses
only to commit new, more heinous sex crimes upon their releases. Af-
ter completing a sentence for rape, Earl Shriner violently and brutally
beat, mutilated, and raped a seven-year-old boy.1 Similarly, after serv-
ing a sentence for forcibly raping four different women, two at knife-
point, Andre Brigham Young was in and out of prison.2 Young later
raped two other women, one with three small children present. 3 Most
recently, Joseph Rosenow raped and murdered Jennie Mae Osborn, a
15-year-old Shelton, Washington girl.4 Rosenow had recently been re-
* J.D. Candidate 2003, Seattle University School of Law; B.A., Louisiana State University.
1. See David Boerner, Confronting Violence: In the Act and in the Word, 15 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 525 (1992).
2. In re Young, 122 Wash.2d 1, 14, 857 P.2d 989, 994 (1993).
3. Young, 122 Wash.2d at 25, 857 P.2d at 994.
4. Newswatch, Sex Offender Please Guilty to Slaying of 15- Year-Old Girl, SEATTLE TIMES,
Aug. 28, 2001, at B3; see Gordy Holt, Sex Offender Facing Charges; Mason County Rocked by
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leased from prison after serving a sentence for second-degree assault
with sexual motivation and had previously been convicted of a violent
rape in 1993.' How do we prevent known sex offenders from commit-
ting more sex crimes? By making it a part of their sentence to keep
them in prison if they continue to be dangerous.6
The Washington legislature's return to indeterminate sentencing
corrects its original mistake of setting fixed sentences for sex offenders
with no supervision after release. Unlike the present civil commitment
system, indeterminate sentencing preventatively detains offenders in
the criminal system, protects the public, and ensures more control
over offenders following their prison terms. Indeterminate sentencing
provides a more efficient and effective alternative to the civil commit-
ment process.
Section II will briefly discuss the progression of sex offender sen-
tencing from the original parole system to the present changes, and
why past structures were instituted and later modified or repealed.
Furthermore, Section II will examine the distinctions between crimi-
nal indeterminate sentencing and civil commitment, outline the cur-
rent state of sentencing for sex offenders, and discuss why sex offend-
ers merit disparate sentencing treatment. Section III will then address
the changes under the new law, how this sentencing will work, and
why this new sentencing scheme will provide a rational system.
II. BACKGROUND-CLARIFYING AND CORRECTING SEX
OFFENDER SENTENCING
A. History of Sentencing Provisions for Sex Offenders in Washington
Sex offender sentencing has seen many transitions and changes in
procedure as well as in policy over the past 100 years. Under the origi-
nal indeterminate sentencing or parole system, judges sentenced of-
fenders to prison terms at their discretion with a parole board deter-
mining the release date.' This parole-based indeterminate sentencing
focused on the rehabilitation of the offender and on the opportunity
Slaying of Girl, Arrest of Man Community was warned about, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Feb. 21, 2001, at B2.
5. See Holt, supra note 4.
6. I use the examples of Earl Shriner, Andre Brigham Young, and Joseph Rosenow to illus-
trate dangerous sex offenders as all three have been the source of much public outrage and media
attention, which has led to legislative action.
7. WASH. REV. CODE§ 9.95 (pre-1981).
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for reformation.' Because of the inconsistency with discretionary sen-
tencing and lack of assurance that convicted offenders would serve any
portion of their full sentence term through the parole system, 9 pre-
sumptive determinate sentencing ° in the form of the Sentencing Re-
form Act ("SRA") was introduced as an across the board change to all
crimes, including sex crimes."1 The SRA's purpose, as cited within
the text of the statute, was to devise just punishment proportionate
with the seriousness of crimes as well as with offenders' criminal his-
tory and consistency in punishments for similar offenders.'
2
While the SRA achieved justness, proportionality, and consis-
tency in sentencing for offenders overall, the Washington legislature
has found determinate sentencing does not present the most effective
sentencing scheme for sex offenders in particular. 3 Most importantly,
presumptive determinate sentencing under the SRA automatically re-
leased sex offenders back into the community after serving their sen-
tences, with no supervision and no provision for further government
action absent another offense. 4
In 1990, in response to public outrage over a convicted sex of-
fender released into the community who violently raped and mutilated
a young boy,' 5 Governor Booth Gardner convened a task force to as-
sess the needs for sex offender sentencing. 6 Due to the absence of su-
pervision and high potential for recidivism for some sex offenders, the
Governor's Task Force on Community Protection recommended that
the Washington legislature adopt a civil commitment procedure for a
8. Id.; see 1935 Wash. Laws ch. 114, § 1; 1947 Wash. Laws ch. 47, § 1.
9. 1981 Wash. Legis. Report ch. 137, § 81 (providing background to indeterminate sen-
tencing; although maximum sentences are provided, the discretionary power of sentencing judges
and the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles failed to ensure offenders were serving sentences).
Other reasons for the change include: wide disparity in sentences received by similar offenders,
lack of accountability, absence of predictability favored in law, and the inability to plan for prison
capacity and management. 1981 Wash. Legis. Report at 71.
10. 1981 Wash. Legis. Report ch. 137 at 71 (presumptive determinate sentencing is prem-
ised upon creation of sentence ranges reflecting the severity of offenses).
11. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.905 (1989); enacted by 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 137, § 39,
effective July 1, 1988.
12. 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 137, § 1 (outlining the purpose of the SRA and goals it hoped to
accomplish for sentencing; other purposes included protection for the public, opportunity for
improvement of offenders, and efficient use of state resources).
13. See Boerner, supra note 1, at 525.
14. Id. at 546 (Governor's Task Force found legal system worked as designed, i.e., punish-
ing crimes committed and releasing offenders back into the community, which was believed to be
unacceptable for sex offenders likely to re-offend).
15. Id. at 525.
16. Exec. Order No. 89-04, Wash. St. Reg. 89-13-055 (1989) (creating The Governor's
Task Force on Community Protection).
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 26:309
small portion of "sexually violent predators."17 The Task Force rec-
ommendations culminated in the Community Protection Act, 18 also
known as the Sexually Violent Predator statute, which enabled the
State to involuntarily civilly commit sexually violent predators19 after
serving their criminal sentence. While this civil commitment scheme
provided an immediate solution to the problem of dangerous sex of-
fenders being released with no supervision2" and satiated the public
outcry, it also presented pressing constitutional issues that garnered
much litigation.
21
Additionally, the Sexually Violent Predator ("SVP") statute did
not apply to all sex offenders, and most offenders were released back
into the community after serving their sentences. Responding to con-
cerns about convicted sex offenders relocating to neighborhoods, the
legislature enacted several measures requiring registration and com-
munity notification, and finally authorized the Department of Correc-
tions to make changes to offenders' community custody conditions.22
However, these measures did not grant the State the means necessary
for controlling sexually violent offenders, once released, in an efficient
and cost-effective manner.
In the 2001 Second Special Session, the Washington Legislature
drastically changed sex offender sentencing beginning with crimes
17. See Boerner, supra note 1, at 547-550 (Task Force found it unnecessary at that time to
overhaul the sentencing system for all sex offenders; it just tried to protect public from small por-
tion of extremely violent individuals).
18. Community Protection Act, 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1001 (codified at WASH. REV.
CODE § 71.09.010).
19. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (2001) (a "sexually violent predator" has a personality
disorder or mental abnormality that is not amenable to treatment, making them likely to engage
in sexually violent behavior).
20. The SVP statute provided an immediate avenue to preventing convicted sex offenders
from re-offending. Being civil in nature, the SVP statute was not subject to the double jeopardy
concerns that an additional criminal procedure would be subject to. The Governor's Task Force
considered other options aside from civil commitment and felt trapped by the double jeopardy
concerns of other sentencing schemes. Boerner, supra note 1, at 548-550.
21. See e.g., Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001) (finding statute civil in nature and non-
punitive and not violating double jeopardy and ex post facto clauses); Brock v. Weston, 31 F.3d
887 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding civil confinement not an extension of previous sentence); In re
Young, 122 Wash.2d 1, 857 P.2d 989 (1993) (finding statute constitutionally permissible civil
commitment and not violating due process, double jeopardy prohibition, or ex post facto
prohibition); In re Brooks, 94 Wash. App. 716, 973 P.2d 486 (1999) (finding statute does not
violate equal protection); In re Aqui, 84 Wash. App. 88, 929 P.2d 436 (1996) (finding statute
does not violate separation of powers doctrine); In re Aguilar, 77 Wash. App. 596, 892 P.2d 1091
(1995) (finding statute not void for vagueness and satisfying equal protection when court
considers less restrictive alternatives to total confinement).
22. See Offender Accountability Act, 1999 Wash. Laws ch. 196, § 1 (1999).
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committed on and after September 1, 2001.23 With the passage of the
Third Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill 6151,24 also known as the Sex
Offender Management Act ("SOMA"), the legislature provided for
the management and sentencing of sex offenders. The bill targets
both those being preventatively detained in civil commitment and
those imprisoned in the criminal system for punishment. Both parts of
SOMA address legitimate public concerns: sex offense prevention and
sex offender management.
To grant the State more control over violent sex offenders and to
ensure public safety, the Washington Legislature returned to a "pa-
role-based" indeterminate sentencing model for sex offenders with
SOMA. The newly enacted SOMA differed from the pre-existing
Sentencing Reform Act. The SRA punished offenders based on desert;
convicted offenders served sentences proportionate with crimes com-
mitted and they were released after completing their sentences. How-
ever, the new sentencing structure under SOMA combines both de-
served punishment with preventative detention in the criminal system.
With the new system, the State is not only punishing based on desert
but also on prevention. These are two inconsistent goals and princi-
ples. Incapacitating based on a finding of dangerousness is not de-
served punishment, but is solely based on prevention. The new system
efficiently combines both the purpose of determinate sentencing in the
criminal system with the incapacitation of the civil commitment proc-
ess into one sentence.
B. Criminal Indeterminate Sentencing for Sex Offenders Compared to the
Civil Commitment System
Major distinctions can be drawn between the civil and criminal
systems. First, the new system under SOMA is criminal in nature-
all of the detention is accomplished in the criminal prison system,
compared to detention at the Special Commitment Center for civil
commitment under the SVP statute.2" Second, the civil commitment
system requires proof that the offender is a sexually violent predator,
finding beyond a reasonable doubt the offender has a mental abnor-
mality or personality disorder not amenable to treatment, making the
offender likely to re-offend.26 The new criminal system established
23. 3ESSB 6151, enacted as the Sex Offender Management Act, 2001 Wash. Laws, ch. 12,
§9.
24. Sex Offender Management Act, 2001 Wash. Laws ch. 12, § 9.
25. See Sex Offender Management Act, 2001 Wash. Laws ch. 12, § 303.
26. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (2002).
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under SOMA requires a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the
offender committed the crime charged, but does not require a finding
of mental illness, abnormality, or personality disorder. In order to con-
tinue holding or preventively detaining the offender, the State must
find the offender is more likely than not to re-offend if released.27
Third, offenders sentenced under SOMA's criminal system will all be
detained in a state prison facility.28 Unlike the civil commitment stat-
ute, which requires several specific facilities to house the residents,29
there is no costly special facility for detention of this target group.
30
Finally, since its enactment in 1990, the SVP statute has been
and continues to be the subject of controversy and litigation. The SVP
statute has been attacked as unconstitutional on several of the follow-
ing fronts: as violating the residents' substantive and procedural due
process rights, as excessive punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, as ex post facto and Double Jeopardy violations, and in
violating the residents' Equal Protection rights.31 Additionally, the
Special Commitment Center, where those civilly committed reside,
currently operates under an injunction because the Center failed to
provide the residents with constitutionally required mental health
treatment and opportunities for eventual rehabilitation and release.32
Although the constitutionality of the overall SVP statute seems
to have been settled by Seling v. Young (discussed infra), the costs to
maintain and defend the system, along with the potential risk of the
Center being shut down for constitutional deficiencies, have seemingly
proved too great for the State to bear.33 The need for efficient, effective
27. See Sex Offender Management Act, 2001 Wash. Laws ch. 12, § 306.
28. See id. at § 304.
29. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (2002). Because the statute is civil, rather than
criminal in nature, those committed are not housed in prison, but in special facilities established
specifically for the civil commitment system.
30. Prisons under the control of the Department of Corrections are already built and main-
tained, unlike the SVP statute that required the State to build entirely new facilities to house
those civilly committed. See id.
31. See e.g., Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001) (holding SVP statute civil and therefore
constitutional); Young v. Weston, 176 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 1999), amended at 192 F.3d 870 (9th
Cir. 1999) (holding SVP statute unconstitutional because punitive as applied); Turay v. Seling,
108 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (W.D. Wa. 2000); Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wa. 1995)
(petition for writ of habeas corpus because SVP criminal and unconstitutional); In re the Deten-
tion of Turay, 139 Wash.2d 379, 986 P.2d 790 (1999); In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of
Young, 122 Wash.2d 1, 857 P.2d 989 (1993) (attacking the SVP statue as unconstitutional be-
cause criminal in nature).
32. Turay v. Seling, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1148,1150 (W.D. Wa. 2000) (discussing the injunc-
tion and the Special Commitment Center's obligations for compliance with the injunction).
33. By rehauling the entire sentencing system, the State is obviously concerned about effi-
ciency and cost.; see Final Bill Report 3ESSB 6151, 2001 Wash. Legis Report.
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control over dangerous sex offenders has always been a concern.3" The
Washington legislature has again chosen to rely on a criminal parole
based indeterminate sentencing, rather than increase the need for fu-
ture reliance on the civil commitment system. This change toward in-
creased management and decreased reliance on the civil commitment
system is a long-range goal. Eradicating the need for the civil com-
mitment system will take many years before it can be fully realized.3"
When the legislature granted the State greater control over sex
offenders through the new sentencing structure, it corrected its origi-
nal mistake in setting determinate sentences with no supervision and
no state control after release. Additionally, preventatively detaining
sex offenders provides greater means for protecting the public in a
more effective and efficient manner than the present civil commitment
system. Accordingly, as the new sentencing measures target the same
offenders as the civil system, 6 the need for the civil commitment sys-
tem will eventually be abolished.
C. Overview of the Current State of Sentencing for Sex Offenders
Sex offender sentencing is complicated and convoluted due to the
many changes in law and procedure. Therefore, only a summary
overview of the process will be provided for a rudimentary under-
standing of the competing issues. For the vast majority of sex offend-
ers,37 the determinate sentencing structure under the SRA still ap-
plies.38 For crimes committed after the SRA took effect, and before
September 1, 2001,' 9 convicted offenders will be given a sentence for a
specific time period rather than a sentencing range.41 Once the of-
fender serves his or her time, the State is powerless to return a person
under supervision in the community to prison beyond the end of his
34. See generally Boerner, supra note 1.
35. It is important to keep in mind that the new law does not immediately repeal or do
away with the SVP statute. The SVP statute will still be in operation as well as the Special Com-
mitment Center where the residents are housed. However, with the new sentencing statute in
effect under the SOMA that includes provisions for indeterminate detention, hopefully the State
will be able to take advantage of the preventative detention under SOMA without having to rely
on the SVP statute.
36. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (2002); Sex Offender Management Act, 2001
Wash. Laws ch 12, § 303.
37. This excludes offenders who committed crimes before the Sentencing Reform Act took
effect and after the Sex Offender Management Act took effect.
38. This includes offenders already convicted or having committed crimes prior to Septem-
ber 1, 2001. These offenders will still be sentenced under determinate sentencing, since applying
the new act to these crimes would violate ex post facto prohibitions in the constitution.
39. September 1, 2001, was the date that Sex Offender Management Act took effect.
40. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.120 (1989) (SRA).
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or her defined term.4 Although the registration and notification laws
provide notice, communities are threatened with the risk of sex of-
fenders re-offending.
After release from determinate sentencing, the only "option
4 2
the State has to prevent offenders from re-entering the community is
the civil commitment process under the SVP statute. The SVP statute
and its civil commitment process will still be in effect, provided the
Special Commitment Center is not shut down. However, it is expen-
sive and only applies to a very small percentage of all sex offenders.4"
Although the civil commitment system will still operate, the function
of the criminal sentencing under SOMA will reduce the amount of of-
fenders eligible for civil commitment. Offenders currently out of
prison who are convicted of new crimes and those convicted of first of-
fenses committed after September 2001 will be sentenced under
SOMA, so the State will not need the civil commitment system for
these offenders. Furthermore, the Department of Corrections' ability
to supervise sex offenders in the community, or place conditions on
their behavior upon supervised release, varies depending on the date
of the offender's crime.44 Not until July 1, 2000, when the Offender
Accountability Act took effect, could the Department of Corrections
adjust conditions pursuant to an offender's changing risk level, and
this only applies to crimes committed after that date.4"
By enacting the new sentencing structure, the Washington legis-
lature responded to a public need for greater safety measures and pro-
vided the means for total state control over convicted sex offenders.
Through the implementation of the new indeterminate sentencing sys-
tem, the State will protect the community from the most dangerous
sex offenders, return control over convicted sex offenders to the crimi-
nal system, and provide efficient control in a cost effective manner for
the State. Because the new sentencing scheme will serve the same pre-
ventative detention purposes once it is fully implemented, the State
41. See Final Bill Report 3ESSB 6151, 2001 Wash. Legis. Report.
42. Of course, the State could release the offenders, count on the high recidivism rate, and
wait for the offender to reoffend. After reoffending and conviction, the State could then sentence
the offender under the Sex Offender Management Act. But, this result is exactly what the State
was taking action against in enacting the SVP statute and its recent return to indeterminate sen-
tencing.
43. This percentage includes only those who have already been convicted of a crime and
suffer from a mental abnormality or personality disorder making them likely to reoffend--this
must be found beyond a reasonable doubt at special trial. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010
(2002).
44. See Final Bill Report, 3ESSB 6151.
45. See Final Bill Report, 3ESSB 6151.
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should stop using the civil commitment system, allowing it to become
obsolete.
D. Why Sex Offenders Are Treated Differently in the Law
The Washington legislature has enacted several laws treating sex
offenders differently than others convicted of non-sex crimes. Many of
the laws regarding sex offender treatment pertain to the prevention of
future sex crimes, such as community notification, sex offender regis-
tration, and civil commitment. Why might legislatures treat sex of-
fenders differently than non-sex offenders? Like others convicted in
our criminal system, sex offenders just commit crimes. All crimes in-
flict pain, loss, and emotional suffering upon their victims, whether
petty theft or rape in the first degree. Though the effects of sex of-
fenses are logically similar to non-sex offenses, sex offenses receive dif-
ferent treatment in the law because, in reality, the sex offenders are
different from non-sex offenders. Furthermore, the effects of sex of-
fenses are grossly dissimilar to the effects of non-sexual offenses.
Women and children are frequently sexually assaulted, present-
ing a very serious problem in our society.46 While men are victims and
targets of sexual assault, women and children are more frequently as-
saulted than men.47 Therefore, this section will refer to sex offenses
against women and children.
The effects of these sexual assaults on innocent victims are dev-
astating and long lasting, and any reduction in the offense rate would
benefit society.4" Contrary to popular belief, sex is not necessarily the
main motivating factor in sexual crimes." Previously, sex itself and
sexual gratification were believed to motivate sex crimes, but studies
have found power and humiliation to be the motivating factors."0 Sex-
ual assaults are blatant attempts to physically and emotionally control
other people." In order to understand why women and children are
repeatedly and overwhelmingly victimized in sexual, rather than non-
sexual assaults, psychologists have looked at our cultural habits and
46. W. L. Marshall et al., Issues in Sexual Assault, in HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL ASSAULT:
ISSUES, THEORIES, AND TREATMENT OF THE OFFENDER 3 (W. L. Marshall et al. eds. 1990).
47. Id.
48. Marshall, supra note 46, at 3-6.
49. Juliet L. Darke, Sexual Aggression: Achieving Power through Humiliation, in
HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL ASSAULT: ISSUES, THEORIES, AND TREATMENT OF THE OFFENDER
55, 57 (W. L. Marshall et al. eds. 1990). Darke conducted a study of erectile responses of sex
offenders and found that, as a whole, the data suggested sexual motivation was not primary in
sexual aggression. Darke, supra note 49, at 57.
50. Darke, supra note 49, at 55.
51. Id. at 58.
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mores.12 A power inequality exists between males and females, with
men possessing the means and ability to control females.5 3 Studies
have shown that men in crisis seek victims for abuse; female and child
victims are often considered safer targets than other males.5 4
In analyzing why assaults contain sexual elements, psychologists
have acknowledged the importance of social constructs of heterosexu-
ality and historical concepts of male ownership of women, women's
sexuality, and their reproductive capabilities.55 To fully control their
victims, offenders must also rob women of their sexual freedom, ar-
guably a woman's most fundamental value. 6 Sexual assaults are gross
personal invasions and extreme violations of bodily integrity, which
inflict more personal violations and inure greater victim vulnerability
than nonsexual assaults.5 7 Because of these findings, psychologists
propose offenders "sexually assault to control, dominate, and humili-
ate their victims."5 8
Sexual predators have a high recidivism rate; coupled with a
mental abnormality, sex offenders are more dangerous than persons
with other disorders.59 Moreover, while most victims of non-sexual as-
sault can receive redress for their violation through the use of the
criminal justice system, restitution, or settlement, sexual assault vic-
tims have been robbed of more than their possessions-they have been
stripped of their bodily integrity, personal autonomy, pride, and most
importantly, their sexual freedom. What redress can a sexual assault
victim achieve? Will a child ever be able to regain his or her sexual in-
nocence or a woman her sexual integrity? Additionally, the public
stresses the need for prevention of future sex offenses and demands
the State remove the offenders from society. On behalf of Washington
State citizens, our government has a duty to protect, but it has chosen
to punish these offenders differently. Sex offenders create disparate
damage and present unique challenges; and for these reasons merit
disparate treatment in the law.
Sex offenders who repeatedly intentionally humiliate, denigrate,
and mutilate their victims deserve different treatment in the law. For
example, in 1989, a repeat sex offender named Earl Shriner anally and
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 59.
55. Id. For example, rape, as a crime against a man's property interest, violated husbands'




59. See In re Young, 122 Wash.2d 1, 857 P.2d 989 (1993).
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orally raped a 7 year-old boy, repeatedly stabbed him in the back, cut
off his penis, and left him for dead.6" The boy had just gone out to ride
his bike in his neighborhood.6 Word of society's worst nightmare
quickly spread with urgent demands for vengeance, action, and pro-
62tection.
Sex offenders prey upon the weak and vulnerable for their vic-
tims. They steal innocence from children and security from the
women they violate. Even non-victimized persons live with the knowl-
edge that sex offenders could next victimize them, a family member,
or a friend. Logic fails to describe why these offenders are so hated
and feared for the misery they wreak on our society. Since sex offend-
ers cause so much destruction in our society, we have chosen to treat
them differently, refusing to bear the risk of more victims when there
is the opportunity for prevention.
III. NEW LAW-PREVENTATIVE DETENTION FOR PUBLIC SAFETY
AND GREATER STATE CONTROL
A. History of the Sex Offender Management Act-Back to Indeterminate
Sentencing for Sex Offenders
The new sentencing structure and the need for more control over
sex offenders were anticipated long before the present changes. Revis-
ing sex offender sentencing back to indeterminate sentencing was first
considered in 1990 when the Governor's Task Force convened.63 The
sentencing scheme enacted under SOMA was actually suggested by
the Executive Committee on Violent Sex Offenders established by the
Washington State Attorney General in 1990 at the same time the Task
Force was convened.64 However, the Task Force chose not to adopt
the sentencing reform, as it would implicate double jeopardy and ex
post facto concerns if implemented immediately.6" As the Task Force
was searching for a way to immediately detain recidivist sex offenders
after their release from prison, the Task Force recommended the SVP




64. Id. at 548; see generally ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON, EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE ON VIOLENT SEX OFFENDERS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (September
1989) (suggesting creation of "sexually dangerous offender sentencing alternative," all sentences
would have been for maximum with the sentencing judge setting minimum based on Sentencing
Reform Act range including a review board hearing to decide future dangerousness after serving
minimum sentence).
65. See Boemer, supra note 1, at 549-550.
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civil commitment process." Soon after its implementation, the civil
commitment statute was challenged on constitutional grounds.67
Kansas has a statute virtually identical to the SVP statute in
Washington. 68 Kansas's statute was similarly challenged on constitu-
tional grounds in Kansas v. Hendricks.69 Consequently, the Washing-
ton legislature considered sex offender sentencing scenarios without
the civil commitment process, in case the civil commitment statute
was declared unconstitutional. 7' A return to indeterminate sentencing
for sex offenders was proposed to replace determinate sentencing and
the civil commitment procedure. 7 In 1997, when the Court found the
Kansas civil commitment statute to be civil and non-punitive in nature
and constitutionally sound, 72 the Washington legislature abandoned
the complete overhaul of sex offender sentencing and continued to de-
pend on the civil commitment statute for preventative detention.73
However, the barrage of litigation was far from over regarding
Washington's civil commitment statute. In 1994, in response to a
resident's lawsuit against the facility and the facility administrators,
Judge Dwyer of the District Court for Western Washington issued an
injunction ordering the Special Commitment Center ("SCC") to bring
the treatment program into compliance with constitutional stan-
dards. 4 In 1998, due to lack of progress by the SCC, Judge Dwyer
held the Center in contempt and ordered it to take actions to bring the
facility into compliance with constitutional requirements, as well as
providing a coherent and individualized treatment program to each
resident showing the way to improvement and release.75
In 2000, the SCC at McNeil Island, Washington, again came be-
fore Judge Dwyer for review, who examined whether the Center was
66. Id. at 550.
67. See In re Young, 122 Wash.2d 1, 857 P.2d 989 (1993) (challenging the civil nature of
the statute and its overall constitutionality).
68. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (2001) (with similar finding to Washington statute,
requiring involuntary civil confinement for sexually violent predators with mental abnormalities
or personality disorders who are likely to reoffend if untreated).
69. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
70. See 3ESSB 6151, Final Bill Report.
71. Id.
72. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369 (holding that Kansas act does not establish criminal
proceedings and is non-punitive and such finding renders Double Jeopardy and ex post facto
analysis irrelevant).
73. See 3ESSB 6151, Final Bill Report.
74. Cunningham v. David Special Commitment Center, 158 F.3d 1035, 1036 (9th Cir.
1998) (factual background of appeal to Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals includes Judge Dwyer's
injunction).
75. See Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming order of contempt
and describing Judge Dwyer's order and requirements for compliance by the Center).
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providing adequate mental health treatment to the residents as re-
quired by the Due Process clause, Supreme Court decisions, and his
1994 injunction. 6 Judge Dwyer found the State, per the SCC, while
making enormous steps to provide adequate treatment to the resi-
dents, still failed to provide less restrictive alternatives for the resi-
dents." Judge Dwyer also remarked in his opinion reviewing the Cen-
ter's improvements that the question of whether "better and more
economical ways exist to prevent sex offenders from re-offending is for
the public and the state legislature, not the courts, to decide."7"
Because the SVP system is civil in nature, the residents must be
offered mental health treatment and an opportunity for eventual re-
lease after successful treatment. The State must provide less restric-
tive housing alternatives to the total confinement SCC.79 If less re-
strictive alternatives were not provided, the plaintiffs would be
unconstitutionally denied due process and the SVP statute would fail.
It is interesting to note that the SCC operates under the same injunc-
tion to this present date.
80
While cases were pending at the Washington State Supreme
Court level,8" the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
Young v. Weston, on appeal from the Ninth Circuit, to decide the con-
stitutionality of the Washington SVP statute." On certiorari, Young
v. Weston became Seling v. Young. 3 Under Seling, the Washington
SVP statute came under direct constitutional attack. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari on March 20, 2000, to resolve a split between
the Ninth Circuit and the Washington State Supreme Court, 4 Seling
was argued on October 31, 2000,5 and the court issued its opinion on
January 17, 2001.86 While the Young litigation was pending, the
76. Turay v. Seling, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (consolidated several cases
for purposes of injunctive relief involving similar claims).
77. Id. (finding the less restrictive alternatives are necessary for the constitutional require-
ment of treatment and the possibility of cure and release).
78. Id. at 1152.
79. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (2002).
80. See Sara Jean Green, Sex-offender plan spurs changes in some cities, others gamble that
State will pick sites elsewhere, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 15, 2002, at B1.
81. In re Turay, 139 Wash.2d 379, 986 P.2d 790 (1999); In re Campbell, 139 Wash.2d 341,
986 P.2d 771 (1999).
82. 192 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 1999), cert granted, Seling v. Young, 529 U.S. 1017 (2000) (de-
ciding whether the conditions of confinement are punitive or non- punitive for purposes of the ex
post facto and double jeopardy clauses).
83. 529 U.S. 1017 (2000).
84. Id.
85. 531 U.S. 250 (2001).
86. Id.
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Washington legislature again considered changing sex offender sen-
tencing in case the civil commitment process was rendered unconstitu-
tional.8 7 The Supreme Court found Washington's SVP statute to be
constitutionally sound,"8 and the Washington legislature was not faced
with eradicating the civil commitment procedure.8 9
Although constitutionally sound, Washington State has spent a
great deal of money litigating the cases to defend its law, in addition to
the mounting costs of running the SCC.90 Those costs, along with the
remaining need for an efficient, effective system for preventing sexu-
ally violent offenses, and a way to provide less restrictive alternatives,
prompted the legislature to pass the omnibus bill in the 2nd Special
Session in 2001.91 Indirectly heeding Judge Dwyer's advice, the Third
Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill 6151, or SOMA, was passed on June
21, 2001. Governor Gary Locke signed the Bill on June 26, 2001.92
B. How the New Sentencing System Works for Sex Offenders
While the whole act pertains to the management of sex offenders
in the civil commitment system and criminal system, the new sentenc-
ing structure located in section 303 of SOMA is the practical focus of
the legislation.93 The sentencing structure under section 303 applies
87. See H.B. 3124, 2000 Leg., 56th Sess. (Wash. 2000) and S.B. 6836, 2000 Leg., 56th
Sess. (Wash. 2000).
88. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001) (declining to use "as applied" analysis and find-
ing the statute to be civil on its face and not violating double jeopardy and ex post facto prohibi-
tions).
89. H.B. 3124 and S.B. 6836 both died in committee.
90. Budget figures for the SCC are about $125,000 per resident, per year. See 3ESSB 6151,
Final Bill Report.
91. Sex Offender Management Act, 2001 Wash. Laws ch. 12, § 9 (2001).
92. 2001 Wash. H. and S. Journal History.
93. The Sex Offender Management Act states:
(1) An offender who is not a persistent offender shall be sentenced under this section
if the offender:
a. Is convicted of:
i. Rape in the first degree, rape in the second degree, rape of a child in the first de-
gree, child molestation in the first degree, rape of a child in the second degree, or in-
decent liberties by forcible compulsion;
ii. Any of the following offenses with a finding of sexual motivation: Murder in the
first degree, murder in the second degree, homicide by abuse, kidnapping in the first
degree, kidnapping in the second degree, assault in the first degree, assault in the sec-
ond degree, assault of a child in the first degree, or burglary in the first degree; or
iii. An attempt to commit any crime listed in this subsection (1)(a); committed on
or after the effective date of this section; or
b. Has a prior conviction for an offenses listed in RCW 9.94A.030(32)(b), and is
convicted of any sex offense which was committed after the effective date of this sec-
tion.
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only to crimes committed after September 1, 2001 .94 Offenders con-
victed of included sex crimes,"' including crimes with a finding of sex-
ual motivation, or attempts to commit any included crimes,97 will be
sentenced under section 303, unless he or she has already been con-
victed of a Two Strike offense, which provides for sentencing accord-
ing to the persistent offender proceedings.9"
If an offender is convicted and section 303 applies, the court will
impose a minimum and a maximum sentence according to the statu-
tory prescription, either within or outside the standard range.9 9 The
sentence will be served in prison, or another state facility, under the
control of the Department of Corrections ("DOC"))" Treatment
(2) An offender convicted of rape of a child in the first or second degree or child mo-
lestation in the first degree who was seventeen years of age or younger at the time of
the offense shall not be sentenced under this section.
(3) Upon a finding that the offender is subject to sentencing under this section, the
court shall impose a sentence to a maximum term consisting of the statutory maxi-
mum sentence for the offense and a minimum term either within the standard range
for the offense, or outside the standard range pursuant to RCW 9.94A.390, if the of-
fender is otherwise eligible for such a sentence.
(4) A person sentenced under subsection (3) of this section shall serve the sentence in
a facility or institution operated, or utilized under contract, by the state. When a
court sentences a person to the custody of the department under this section, the court
shall, in addition to the other terms of the sentence, sentence the offender to commu-
nity custody under supervision of the department and the authority of the board for
any period of time the person is released from total confinement before the expiration
of the maximum sentence.
a. Unless a condition is waived by the court, the conditions of community custody
shall include those provided for in RCW 9.94A.700(4). The conditions may also in-
clude those provided for in RCW 9.94A.700(5). The court may also order the of-
fender to participate in rehabilitative programs or otherwise perform affirmative con-
duct reasonably related to the circumstances of the offense, the offender's risk of
reoffending, or the safety of the community, and the department and the board shall
enforce such conditions pursuant to sections 304, 307, and 308 of this act.
b. As part of any sentence under this section, the court shall also require the of-
fender to comply with any conditions imposed by the board under sections 304 and
306 through 309 of this act.
Sex Offender Management Act, 2001 Wash. Laws ch. 12, § 303.
94. Id.
95. Id. Included crimes are: rape in the first degree, rape in the second degree, rape of a
child in the first degree, child molestation in the first degree, rape of a child in the second degree,
or indecent liberties by forcible compulsion. Id.
96. Id. Included crimes are: any of the following with a finding of sexual motivation: mur-
der in the first degree, murder in the second degree, homicide by abuse, kidnapping in the first
degree, kidnapping in the second degree, assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree,
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shall be provided to offenders while incarcerated, although the guide-
lines for such treatment are not outlined in the Act itself.
No later than ninety days before the minimum term expires, the
Indeterminate Sentencing Review Board' ("ISRB") shall examine the
offender, using methodologies recognized by experts in the prediction
of sexual dangerousness, to determine whether the offender will en-
gage in sex offenses if released. 1 2 The ISRB will determine by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence if the offender is more likely than not to
commit sex offenses if released on conditions set by the board.'
The presumption is toward release of the offender, unless the
State proves the offender is more likely than not to re-offend. If found
likely to re-offend, the offender will be sent back to the Department of
Corrections with a new minimum term, not to exceed two years.0 4
This procedure of dangerousness review and setting minimum sen-
tence terms will continue until the offender is released or has served
his or her maximum term.105 After release, the offender will be subject
to conditions set by the Board until the expiration of the maximum
sentence.0 6 If the offender fails to comply with any condition, the
State has the authority to return the offender to prison under the
maximum sentence."° The ISRB was chosen to make these release de-
cisions because the Board has immunity from lawsuits resulting from
its release decisions.0 8 This immunity will be even more important
now that the purpose of detention is to prevent future crimes, rather
than to rehabilitate offenders.
C. The Sex Offender Management Act's Purpose & Policies
The main focus of SOMA is public health, safety, and welfare.
Although the sentencing changes for sex offenders are the practical fo-
cus of the Act for the criminal justice system, the Bill addresses more
than just sentencing. The Sex Offender Management Act accom-
plishes two major legislative goals. First, it provides location siting for
less restrictive alternatives to comply with the due process constitu-
tional requirements of the SVP statute; it provides funds and guide-
101. The ISRB was originally known as the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles under the
original parole system and was renamed the "Indeterminate Sentence Review Board" in 1986.
1986 Wash. Laws ch. 224.





107. Sex Offender Management Act, 2001 Wash. Laws ch. 12, § 303.
108. See Taggart v. State, 118 Wash.2d 195, 822 P.2d 243 (1992).
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lines for location selection in surrounding communities meant for
eventual reintegration of some residents into the community, and pre-
empts local land use codes and plans."0 9 Second, the Act restructures
sex offender sentencing and returns it to an indeterminate sentencing
scheme in the criminal justice system, allowing for more direct control
over offenders through completion of sentence and release.' The
portion of the Bill relating to siting and operation of secure transition
facilities is a vital piece of the legislation as it is essential to the sur-
vival of the civil commitment process; it provides less restrictive alter-
natives for housing civilly committed offenders. These two Bill func-
tions go hand in hand-pertaining to sex offenders-although they
may not seem like it at first glance.
D. Constitutionally Justifying Limited Preventative Detention of
Criminally Convicted Sex Offenders
There are two separate phases to the detention under SOMA: (1)
the immediate detention served under the minimum sentence; and (2)
the detention after the dangerousness review, based on prevention of
future crimes. The entire sentence, from the mandatory minimum to
the maximum, is logically not "deserved," as indicated by the danger-
ousness review. The first phase of the detention is not based on pre-
vention, but punishment based on desert."' As a result, it will not be
at issue. Because the second phase of the sentence arguably is not
based on desert, but is based on preventing future crimes, this phase
of detention will raise issues of justification. Although proponents will
argue the detention is part of the complete sentence based on deserved
punishment, with opportunity for early release for good behavior just
like the earlier parole system, the second phase of the detention only
takes place after dangerousness has been proved. Therefore, the sec-
ond phase is not deserved detention, but is detention based on preven-
tion of future harm.
Limited preventative detention following a criminal conviction of
a sex offense based on an offender's continuing dangerousness is con-
stitutionally valid when no release condition would reasonably assure
public safety."' For instance, the United States Supreme Court has
109. Sex Offender Management Act, 2001 Wash. Laws ch. 12, §§ 201-226.
110. Sex Offender Management Act, 2001 Wash. Laws ch. 12, §§ 301-363.
111. Desert is a fundamental justification for punishment after commission of a crime
against the State.; see Boerner, supra note 1.
112. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987) (deciding that pre-trial detention
was valid where arrestee was held under the Bail Reform Act of 1984-different context than
post-trial, post-conviction preventative detention).
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had ample opportunity to review different methods of "preventative
detention" in the last twenty years."' The Supreme Court has upheld
methods of detention based on civil commitment, pre-trial detention,
and detention of aliens unlawfully residing in the U.S. " 4 Because
SOMA is a criminal sentencing scheme, it can be differentiated from
the Supreme Court's previous holdings.
The statutory language under SOMA is clear and unambiguous.
The Act establishes criminal, punitive detention for sex offenses. " 'S
Freedom from bodily restraint is a fundamental liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause." 6 However, a state, pursuant to its police
power, may imprison those convicted of crimes against the state for
deterrence and retribution.117 There are, of course, constitutional lim-
its on what conduct the state can criminalize. "8 Because it is criminal
detention, SOMA must comport with Due Process.
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause forbids state
governments from depriving any person of liberty without due process
of law. " 9 The Due Process Clause contains a substantive component
that bars certain "arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of
the fairness of the procedures used to implement them." 2° State
detention violates the Due Process Clause unless ordered in a criminal
proceeding with adequate procedural protection or in narrow non-
punitive circumstances, such as pre-trial detention and civil commit-
ment where special justifications provide constitutional justification. 21
Alternatively, SOMA is constitutionally valid on its face. For in-
stance, the Act is legitimate as criminal detention for deserved crimes
and limited preventative detention based on continuing dangerous-
ness. Strict scrutiny analysis applies to fundamental rights in due
113. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682-702 (2001) (holding indefinite and
potentially permanent detention of aliens unlawfully present in the United States unconstitu-
tional); Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 263 (2001) (upholding civil commitment of sexually vio-
lent predators as constitutionally permissible); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997)
(holding civil commitment of sexually violent predators constitutionally permissible); Foucha v.
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 84 (1992) (holding civil commitment of insanity acquitee constitutionally
impermissible if no longer insane and not proved dangerous); Salerno, 481 U.S. at 741 (holding
pre-trial preventative detention under Bail Reform Act of 1984 constitutional); Jones v. U.S., 463
U.S. 354, 370(1983) (holding civil commitment of insanity acquitee constitutionally permissible).
114. Supra, footnote 113.
115. Sex Offender Management Act, 2001 Wash. Laws ch. 12, § 303.
116. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80; Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982).
117. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80.
118. Id.
119. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
120. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80.
121. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 666-67 (2001).
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process questions, 122 in this case the freedom from restraint, requiring
a compelling interest and a narrowly tailored measure to the interest
being served. 123 Courts have found that sufficiently compelling gov-
ernmental interests can justify detention of dangerous persons in nar-
row circumstances. First and foremost, a state's regulatory interest
in public safety can, at times, outweigh an individual's interest in per-
sonal liberty.1
25
The government's interest in preventing crime, especially violent
sex crimes, is both legitimate and compelling.1 26 This compelling in-
terest is heightened after the state has proved beyond a reasonable
doubt in a criminal trial that the offender committed a sex crime.
1 27
The conviction illustrates the offender's potential for committing such
offenses in the future128 and justifies the Act's preventative detention
function.
A convicted sex offender's liberty interests may be subordinated
by the State's compelling interest in preventing further sex crimes.
Due Process requires the nature and duration of the detention bear
some reasonable relation to the purpose of the detention. 29 Detention
based on preventing future dangerousness is therefore permissible if
the nature and duration of the detention are tailored to reflect pressing
safety concerns related to the offender's dangerousness.
130
The Salerno decision is significant to this discussion of commit-
ment and preventative detention because it was the first Supreme
Court decision to analyze the constitutionality of adult preventative
detention in the criminal system.' The Salerno reasoning is therefore
more relevant and persuasive than reasoning in other preventative de-
tention cases because the court analyzed detention in criminal cases,
rather than civil commitments. The Salerno Court concluded that the
pretrial detention under the Bail Reform Act of 1984 was not punitive
122. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80.
123. Id.
124. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987).
125. See id.
126. See id. at 749-750 (emphasis added).
127. See id. at 750-751.
128. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) (finding "previous instances of
violent behavior are an important indicator of future violent tendencies"); Jones v. United States,
463 U.S. 354, 364 (1983) (finding "the fact that a person has been found, beyond a reasonable
doubt, to have committed a criminal act certainly indicate dangerousness").
129. Jones, 463 U.S. at 368.
130. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 88 (citing to Salerno).
131. Michael W. Youtt, Note, The Effect of Salerno v. United States on the Use of State
Preventative Detention Legislation: A New Definition of Due Process, 22 GA. L. REV. 805, 810
(1988).
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and was permissible regulatory detention because Congress intended
the detention to provide safety to the community in preventing further
crimes, which the Court found to be a legitimate regulatory goal.
13 2
Under the Bail Reform Act, arrestees charged with certain crimes in-
volving violence or repeat offenses and who posed a significant danger
to the community if released could be preventatively detained pending
trial.133 In order to detain the arrestee, the Government must prove by
clear and convincing evidence in an adversary hearing that no condi-
tions of release would reasonably assure the community's safety.'34
The Salerno Court upheld this detention as it was carefully limited to
the most serious of crimes, the arrestee was entitled to a prompt deten-
tion hearing where the Government bore the burden of proving dan-
gerousness, and the length of the pretrial detention was of a finite du-
ration. 35
Additionally, the Salerno Court did not find the pretrial deten-
tion excessive, as it related to the regulatory goal of protecting the
public and preventing future dangerousness.'36 Also, the Govern-
ment's compelling interest in preventing crime was bolstered by its
ability to offer convincing proof that the person detained, already in-
dicted on a serious crime, was dangerous.' 37 Under these narrow cir-
cumstances, the crime prevention interest was penultimate, 3' and con-
sistent with the Due Process Clause, the arrestee could be detained in
order to protect that interest. 139 Under SOMA, offenders will be im-
prisoned following a criminal conviction, either by criminal trial and
proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a guilty plea.
The criminal conviction of a sex offense is proof in itself that the
offenders are dangerous. These sex offenders will serve a mandatory
minimum sentence and will be preventatively detained only after the
State proves upon a preponderance of the evidence that the offender is
more likely than not to commit another sex offense if released. If it is
shown that an offender is likely to re-offend, he or she is held for a fi-
nite duration of no more than two years. The total detention is not in-
definite. Rather, the detention, based on dangerousness, is limited by
the stringent time limitations of the offender's maximum sentence.
132. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 751.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 750.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 751.
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The detention under SOMA, like the detention in Salerno, is
permissive and narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. These
persons are dangerous, and more dangerous than the detained persons
under Salerno, as they have already been convicted of sex crimes and
are serving their sentences.14° Their prolonged detention is based on
prevention of future crimes. Because the State has shown that the of-
fenders are more likely than not to re-offend if released, even with
conditions of community custody like notification and reporting to a
community custody officer, the State has determined that no measure
other than their continued detention would provide community safety.
Procedural due process requires that the substantive elements be
implemented in a fair manner." The detention takes place following a
criminal conviction with all of its procedural safeguards. In order to
further detain these offenders following the minimum sentence, the
State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the offender
is likely to re-offend and that no other protection except continued de-
tention will suffice. The State must bear this burden at every single
dangerousness review. The offenders will be provided treatment to
decrease the likelihood of their re-offending and to increase the likeli-
hood of their release. The duration of the preventative detention is fi-
nite. Detention following the dangerousness review cannot exceed two
years and total confinement cannot exceed the offender's maximum
sentence.
A potential area for concern regarding substantive and proce-
dural Due Process is the State's burden of proof that the offender con-
tinues to pose a threat if released, will re-offend, and should therefore
be further detained. The Sex Offender Management Act only requires
a simple preponderance of the evidence standard. The initial proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the offender committed a sex crime, in
addition to the dangerousness review standard, is more than sufficient
to withstand scrutiny. However, because the dangerousness review is a
separate and distinct proceeding, it should be bolstered with a height-
ened burden of proof similar to that required by the Bail Reform Act
upheld in Salerno. The Bail Reform Act requires proof upon clear and
convincing evidence that there are no suitable release conditions. The
State should reconsider the preponderance of the evidence standard in
light of previous Supreme Court decisions and amend the Act to re-
140. If the government's interest in preventing crime by arrestees was both legitimate and
compelling in Salerno, then it surely is here where the individuals have already been convicted of
crimes instead of just charged with them.
141. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
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quire the State to show clear and convincing evidence of the offender's
continuing dangerousness.
With all of these procedural safeguards in addition to the sub-
stantive safeguards provided by SOMA and the criminal justice sys-
tem itself, limited detention of sex offenders following criminal con-
victions based on continuing dangerousness is constitutionally
justified. As the system is constitutionally valid, an inquiry into its ra-
tionality and viability as a preventative detention scheme is warranted.
E. Is the Act a Rational System and Will It Succeed As a Preventative
Detention Scheme?
The new scheme presents two goals and functions of sentencing:
(1) incarceration and punishment based on desert; and (2) preventative
detention based on a finding of future dangerousness.
Paul Robinson, a professor of law at Northwestern University,
recently examined the divergent goals in punishing dangerousness in
an article entitled Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventative De-
tention as Criminal Justice. 2 In the article, Professor Robinson posits if
further detention is needed beyond a prison term to prevent future
crimes, the system preventatively detaining offenders should be open
about its purpose.'43 Robinson believes the criminal justice system is
the wrong place for such efforts and should only be used as punish-
ment for deserved sentences, not future crimes.'44 Robinson argues
that cloaking preventative detention as criminal justice offers practical
advantages in bypassing the logical restrictions to preventative deten-
tion."'
Robinson also presents four factors to analyze the rationality of
preventative detention in criminal systems. 146 First, if the detention is
justified with dangerousness, then as soon as the dangerousness is no
longer a factor, the justification for detention ends.147 While detained
for dangerousness, the government should be required to periodically
prove the offender's continuing dangerousness. 48 Characterizing the
preventative detention as deserved punishment eliminates the need for
periodic review, as dangerousness is not an element of deserved pun-
142. See Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloahing Preventative Detention as
Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429 (2001).
143. See Id. at 1432.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1446.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1432.
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ishment' 49 Second, when the detention benefits society with increased
public safety, rather than functioning as punishment deserved by the
offender, the confinement should not be punitive. °50 Imprisonment for
punishment inflicts suffering upon the offender, suffering that is in-
consistent with preventative detention's goal of protecting the pub-
lic.' Rather than being punished, those who are preventatively de-
tained for a societal benefit should only suffer an intrusion of personal
liberty at the least.'52 Third, this preventative detention should be
limited to the minimum necessary for the public's safety.1 3 In con-
trast, deserved punishment does not merit the same minimum pun-
ishment analysis as detention for prevention."5 4 Finally, if treatment
could reduce the length or the intrusiveness of the detention, it should
be provided under the preventative detention principle.'
Using Robinson's factors, indeterminate sentencing under
SOMA can be analyzed to determine whether it is a rational preventa-
tive detention system or whether Washington is cloaking preventative
detention and is now "punishing dangerousness." Although Robinson
believes using the criminal justice system to prevent future crimes
perverts the justice process,'56 Washington's use of the criminal justice
system to prevent future crimes outweighs the costs and controversy
of prevention using the civil commitment system.
Overall, Washington's indeterminate sentencing for sex offend-
ers provides a rational system for preventative detention as it periodi-
cally reviews and proves offenders' dangerousness, is limited to the
minimum detention necessary for public safety, and provides treat-
ment to offenders. First, the sentencing scheme under SOMA clearly
presents itself as a criminal system. The sentencing format is added to
the criminal sentence statute' 57 and describes the management of of-
fenders in the criminal justice system as being one of its main pur-









157. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A (1989) (Sentencing Reform Act of 1981); Sex Of-
fender Management Act, 2001 Wash. Laws ch.12, § 303 at 9.
158. See Sex Offender Management Act, 2001 Wash. Laws ch.12, § 101.
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tence ' "'1s and is not referred to as commitment or some other label
connoting anything other than a criminal measure.'60
Second, the Act requires continuing examinations of dangerous-
ness and justification for continued incarceration.' 6 ' Before the mini-
mum sentence has been completed,'62 the offender will be examined to
determine whether he or she is likely to engage in sex offenses if re-
leased.'63 Although this portion of the sentence is clearly predicated
on punishment for the crime committed,'64 what follows after the dan-
gerousness assessment is confinement based on prevention.'65 Under
determinate sentencing, the offender would have been presented with
the same sentence range.'66 However, after serving the minimum
range of his or her sentence, that portion which is based on punish-
ment and desert, the offender would have been released back into the
community. 167 On the other hand, under indeterminate sentencing,
the offender is subject to further detention after serving the portion of
his or her sentence based on desert.'68 If it is found by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the offender is more likely than not to com-
mit another sex offense if released, 169 then the offender will be held for
a new minimum term, not to exceed two years.170 At the end of this
new minimum term, the offender will again be subject to a dangerous-
ness assessment, and this process will continue for the statutory
maximum of the crime.' The opportunity for dangerousness review,
although infrequent, does provide a recurring method of proving cur-
rent dangerousness, thereby justifying continued incapacitation.
159. Id.
160. As distinguished from the civil commitment system, which refers to "commitment."
161. See Sex Offender Management Act, 2001 Wash. Laws ch.12, § 306.
162. Id.
163. Id. (using incorporated methodologies recognized by experts in the prediction of sex-
ual dangerousness and including a prediction of the probability that the offender will re-offend).
164. This portion of the crime is mandatory and would be served under a determinate sen-
tencing structure.
165. The State has proved that the offender is more likely than not to commit another sex
offense if released, so the finding is based on prevention, as opposed to deserved punishment.
166. See Sex Offender Management Act, 2001 Wash. Laws ch. 12; WASH. REV. CODE §
9.94A.130 (SRA).
167. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.130 (2002).
168. Sex Offender Management Act, 2001 Wash. Laws ch. 12, § 303 at 9.
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Third, the system on its face is clearly punitive. However, when
offenders are released into community custody1 2 rather than further
detained in prison after the dangerousness review, the resulting meas-
ure is then non-punitive. The offender serves his or her sentence in
prison in the custody of the Department of Corrections."' This in-
cludes not only the minimum sentence based on desert and punish-
ment, but also the extended sentence after the dangerousness assess-
ment, based on prevention. Therefore, the offender being
incapacitated, based on a premise of prevention, suffers the same in-
carceration as those offenders serving sentences based on punishment.
Contrary to punitive detention, another distinct provision of SOMA is
the community custody requirement upon offender release,'74 where
offenders are returned their personal liberty, subject to conditions
placed upon their community custody. 7 ' Offenders sentenced under
the Act are subject to community custody until the expiration of their
maximum sentence, 176 which could be life for some offenses.'77 Some
might consider this release from detention with community custody
restrictions punitive, however, in comparison to total confinement in
prison, it could hardly be considered punitive.
At the dangerousness review, after proving that the offender is
likely to re-offend and that even with community custody, community
registration and notification, the community will not be safe, the of-
fender is returned to prison. The State should consider detaining these
offenders, following the dangerousness review, in a less restrictive al-
ternative to total confinement with other prisoners serving deserved
sentences. The less restrictive alternative should be non-punitive, as
the State should not be punishing these offenders for their continuing
dangerousness. Rather, the State should be simply detaining and pro-
viding treatment to them until they are no longer a threat and can be
released.
Fourth, preventative detention should be limited to the measure
of confinement necessary for the public's safety. During the mini-
mum portion of their sentence, offenders are in prison under the con-
trol of the Department of Corrections. Offenders remain in prison
172. Community custody is the effective equivalent of parole. Offenders are released from
prison with restrictions on their mobility and requirements for periodic communication with
their community custody officers.
173. Sex Offender Management Act, 2001 Wash. Laws ch.12, § 303(4).
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only so long as they are still considered dangerous and likely to re-
offend. When the offender is found less likely to re-offend, then he or
she should be allowed back into the community. Even after release, all
offenders will remain subject to conditions of community custody fur-
ther protecting the public. At each level of the sentence, detention is
limited to the minimum confinement necessary for the public safety.
Fifth, treatment should be available to offenders during their in-
carceration, especially if it could reduce the amount of time they are
incapacitated or affect their determination of dangerousness. Sex of-
fender treatment shall be provided to offenders during their incarcera-
tion. 78 Because this is a different system than provided for under the
civil commitment statute, and the system is not predicated on mental
illness, abnormality, or treatable personality disorders,'79 treatment is
not constitutionally required. However, since the system is predicated
on prevention and eventual release once dangerousness is no longer at
issue, treatment is logically required. Because the treatment for of-
fenders is not defined in the Act, when the treatment should occur
remains undefined. If the release determination will be made upon
finding of non-dangerousness, treatment should logically be provided
at all times during incarceration to provide offenders an opportunity to
be released after only their original minimum sentence and reduce the
chances they will re-offend once released.
All sentencing is politically motivated and SOMA is no excep-
tion. The legislative process, as a political machine negotiating com-
promises between the law and the public, rarely provides theoretically
pure policies and procedures. Even though Washington's new system
for sex offenders does not match up with all of Robinson's factors, in-
dicating Washington may now be punishing dangerousness, the legis-
lature responded to what the public needed by providing greater secu-
rity and protection from repeat sex offenders.
IV. CONCLUSION
Transitions, changes in legislation, and their effects often take
time and usage to come to fruition. Because the new sentencing meas-
ures only apply to crimes committed after September 1, 2001, sentenc-
ing for those crimes may be months from now. Accordingly, it may
178. Sex Offender Management Act, 2001 Wash. Laws ch.12, § 305.
179. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09 (2002) (SVP statute) (predicated on treatment); see
also Turay v. Selig, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (requiring treatment and profes-
sional standards for treatment to comply with constitutional requirements of due process).
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take years for the full system, with the working release determinations,
to be reviewed.
The new sentencing structure is a departure from presumptive
determinate sentencing for sex offenders and a return to indeterminate
"parole-based" sentencing. It will eventually obviate the need for the
SVP statute and provide a more efficient, effective alternative in the
interim. Consider the following characteristics of the new system: it
presents determinate sentencing minimums; it pertains to only the
most dangerous, violent sex offenders, a small percentage of total of-
fenders; it provides an opportunity for treatment; it appropriately tar-
gets sexually violent offenders likely to re-offend; it provides non-
violent offenders an opportunity to get out of prison; and it offers pre-
ventative detention solutions in response to dangerousness without re-
quiring a finding of mental abnormality or personality disorder to pre-
ventatively detain offenders.18 ° Most importantly, the new system is
superior to the civil commitment system as a method of sex offender
management. It allows for community custody and supervision of the
offender for the statutory maximum of the offense and enables the
State to immediately pull the offender back into the system if he or she
re-offends. Additionally, the new system, which was enacted in re-
sponse to the public's concerns, is a more efficient expenditure of the
State's resources, and it provides a rational system for preventative de-
tention.
Finally, the newly enacted system is not perfect as it stands, and
it may be improved. The Sex Offender Management Act would better
withstand due process scrutiny if a heightened burden of proof were
substituted for a preponderance of the evidence standard at the dan-
gerousness review, in light of previous Supreme Court precedent. In
addition, the Act would provide a fully rational system if non-punitive
housing conditions were provided for those preventatively detained
after the dangerousness review.
While it may take time for the new structure to function, the
changes present the most comprehensive reform in sex offender sen-
tencing to date. As long as the system works as designed, the return to
indeterminate sentencing for sex offenders will correct the lack of su-
pervision of sex offenders created by determinate sentencing, return
180. The Sexually Violent Predator civil commitment statute requires a jury finding of
mental abnormality or personality not amenable to treatment to commit an offender and hold the
offender beyond his or her sentence. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (2001). The new statute
requires no such finding. See Sex Offender Management Act, 2001 Wash. Laws ch. 12.
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much control to the State, and provide an alternative to civil commit-
ment, eventually rendering it obsolete.
